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UNHCR’s community development approach (CDA) consists of a disparate set of
guidelines designed to strengthen the self-reliance of refugees during protracted
displacement. It envisions refugees as agents of their own development, and aims to
prepare them for a durable solution. But in the absence of basic standards and
benchmarks, the CDA is being used—by implementing partners as well as specia-
lized units with the agency—as an opportunity to advance rights-based develop-
ment. This raises a number of concerns related to the desired aims of the CDA, the
accountability of UNHCR and its implementing partners and its capacity to
administer development while preserving its core mandate. This article casts a
critical eye over CDA as experienced in Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal. It
contends that UNHCR must develop appropriate standards for CDA. At the
very least, the agency must move beyond basic emergency benchmarks and toward
minimum standards that strengthen self-reliance and empower refugees, but do not
simultaneously undermine prospects of achieving a durable solution.
Introduction
UNHCR’s mandate is to ensure protection in the short term and promote
durable solutions for refugees in the long term. Durable solutions range from
safe and dignified repatriation or permanent settlement in the host country to
third-country resettlement if other options are not viable. Where durable solu-
tions are not immediately present, UNHCR has an obligation to ensure the
‘protection’ and ‘care and maintenance’ of refugees. In order to provide equitable
and cost-effective distribution of basic services, particularly in protracted refugee
situations, the agency has recently articulated a community development
approach (CDA). Instrumentalist by design, the CDA serves as a set of cost-
saving guidelines for UNHCR and its implementing partners. In as much as the
policy endeavours to promote ‘self-reliance’ and ‘ownership’ among refugees, it
also reflects the dominant liberal and rights-laden discourse shared by Western
institutions, including UNHCR. Where uncritically interpreted and applied,
however, the CDA may have unintended, and in some cases negative, long-term
consequences for the achievement of durable solutions.
Drawing on the case of the protracted refugee situation in Nepal, this article
contends that in the absence of clear standards and benchmarks, the promotion
of the CDA can have counterintuitive effects.1 In Nepal, the application of the
CDA by development-oriented implementing partners has led the Bhutanese
refugee population to enjoy disproportionately higher indicators of well-being
than the ‘host’ community. In addition to the tension generated by this situation,
the unrestrained promotion of the CDA has led to heightened political activism,
the escalation of demands for improved services and widespread disillusionment
among Bhutanese refugees. Perversely, the refugee population’s sustained access
to development assistance and prolific campaigning for democracy has also
strengthened the intransigence of Bhutan and Nepal in negotiations to arrive
at a durable solution. Moreover, because the quality and quantity of donor
support for the camps is stagnating, social pathologies among the refugees
are quietly emerging. In addition to holding governments accountable and
adopting more principled (and difficult) judgments about when to end opera-
tions, there is an urgent need for UNHCR and its implementing partners to
develop appropriate standards for the CDA.
UNHCR’s Mandate: Protection and Durable Solutions
From Africa to Asia, protracted refugee situations are fast becoming the rule
rather than the exception. Due in part to the reluctance of many countries to
accept significant refugee inflows, many are forced to remain in camps or set-
tlements (Black 1998; Crisp 2002). Indeed, the profile of refugees and their needs
has changed. In Africa, for example, hundreds of thousands of Sudanese,
Somalis and Ethiopian refugees have been languishing in Kenya and Uganda
for more than a decade. In South Asia, the story is similar. For more than two
decades there have been Rohingyas from Myanmar in Bangladesh; Sri Lankan
Tamils, Bangladeshi Chakmas, and Tibetans in India; Afghans in Pakistan and
Iran; and Bhutanese in Nepal (UNHCR 2002). Refugee camps created during
refugee emergencies are in many cases still operating with the same procedures
and standards as they did when first opened (Jamal 2000; Crisp 2001). The
question of what standards are universally appropriate and how to measure
them is currently rising to the top of UNHCR’s agenda.
The concern with protracted refugee situations within UNHCR is taking shape
against a backdrop of broad budgetary constraints across the UN, growing
donor intolerance of long-term refugee situations and a debate over the merits
of linking relief and developmental approaches to assistance. Though UNHCR is
mandated to address the protection needs of refugees—including when no dur-
able solution is in sight—the agency is still experimenting with developmental
approaches to care and maintenance operations, as it has since the 1970s. While
many NGOs have applauded the development-oriented approach espoused by
UNHCR, it is not warmly received in all quarters. Indeed, there is a vocal group
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within the agency that continues to call for a narrow focus on legal protection and
an exclusively political engagement with governments that abrogate their obliga-
tions under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967
Protocol. Many of these critics believe that the CDA would potentially shift the
burden of responsibility away from expelling countries to donor governments,
UNHCR, implementing partners and hosting states themselves.
It is a moot point that the CDA emerged in response to advocacy, donor and
budgetary pressures. UNHCR is continuously called upon by human rights
groups and NGOs to expand its mandate. But notwithstanding internal divisions
over the breadth of the organization’s mandate, over the past few years UNHCR
has faced dramatic budget cuts. On the eve of its fiftieth anniversary, for example,
the agency was forced to borrow US$40 million from its working capital to
finance its programmes. But the case of the decade-old camps in Nepal shows
that in the absence of clear standards for the CDA, UNHCR and its implement-
ing partners face an uncomfortable paradox. In addition to internal institutional
debates over the objectives (and appropriate indicators, benchmarks and stan-
dards) of the CDA, its application can generate a host of new and avoidable
challenges to UNHCR’s mandate.
Tensions over the ‘developmentalization’ of camps persists among donor
governments, which are wary of investing too heavily in what are inherently
temporary situations, and host governments that have been legitimately con-
cerned with ensuring adequate burden sharing and compensation for refugee
settlements (UNHCR 1994). According to Barnett (2001: 32), in the mid-1990s
‘states are willing to license these [development] activities not because of an
outpouring of generosity but because of its very deficit’. In other words, states
were backing away from their responsibilities for refugees at the same time as the
post-Cold War refugee caseloads were growing.
The Emergence of a Community Development Policy
Established in 1994, the CDA reflects progressive thinking in the development
community. It builds on recent normative innovations promoted by UNHCR
such as the adoption of community approaches (rather than case management) to
care and maintenance, a shift from top-down to more participatory approaches
to achieving durable solutions and a transition from a service-delivery culture to
one that engages the capacities of refugees in their own development and treats
them as agents rather than subjects.2
The CDA assumes that refugees should have ownership of programming in
order to improve their situation and that their ‘skills’ and ‘capacities’ should be
strengthened in order to inculcate self-reliance and reduce dependency. Its stated
objectives are fourfold: (i) to strengthen refugee initiative and participation in
order to ensure ownership of all phases of programme implementation; (ii) to
reinforce the dignity and self-esteem of refugees; (iii) to achieve a higher degree of
self-reliance and (iv) to increase the cost effectiveness and sustainability of
UNHCR programmes (UNHCR 2001).
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Though the CDA endorses a wide cluster of approaches to care and main-
tenance, a few are especially salient. The introduction of ‘democratic man-
agement structures’ is desirable in order to improve accountability and
transparency in camp decision-making and the distribution of food among
refugee households. ‘Participatory approaches’ to decision-making are also
introduced at the camp management level to encourage ownership and self-
reliance among refugees. The promotion of ‘women and children’s rights’, in
addition to advocating their more equitable access to basic services, is intended
to reduce their overall vulnerability and improve the well-being of households.
Though intuitively desirable, these objectives are means and not necessarily
ends in and of themselves.
UNHCR’s CDA is distinct from mainstream development approaches in
one important respect. The CDA does not explicitly promote development as
a cluster of indivisible human rights, but rather as a means to an end. Unlike
the majority of UNHCR’s implementing partners, who aim to promote the
development of vulnerable groups irrespective of their situation, UNHCR’s
ends are largely focused on ensuring protection and a durable solution and
reducing costs for refugee care and maintenance. Protection, UNHCR
argues, is best realized when refugees are safely resettled, returned or
locally integrated. As noted by UNHCR, community development is to
continue
only to the point where refugees achieve economic self-support and a level of well-
being compatible to that of the local population . . . where additional work is
needed to upgrade the standard of living of both refugees and nationals,
UNHCR approaches the government or other organizations to support and
carry this out (1996: 3).
In introducing the CDA, UNHCR aims to strengthen the quality and
distribution of goods and services, contribute to the overall health and well-
being of the community and reduce costs by reducing dependency and stimu-
lating ownership. While refugees in protracted situations no doubt demand
development, it should be recalled that the UNHCR is not a ‘development’
organization per se.
Therein lies an obvious tension. Where do ‘means’ end and rights begin? In
addition to being the primary guarantor of refugee law, UNHCR is also a
human rights organization. The 1951 Convention draws explicitly on the
1948 International Declaration of Human Rights. Development is also a
human right.3 Is UNHCR not then obliged to promote rights-based develop-
ment? More problematic, and not unique to UNHCR, where does the promotion
of rights end? Perhaps of equal importance, will the promotion of these rights
serve UNHCR’s overall objective, namely a durable and lasting solution for
refugees?
Because these questions are not front and centre within UNHCR, there is
considerable internal institutional confusion over the precise aims of the CDA.
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Indeed, specialized units focusing on gender and children and health at head-
quarters are churning out guidelines and reports on the importance of rights-
based approaches for field offices. Implementing partners, who themselves aim to
promote the development of vulnerable groups irrespective of their political
situation, have often articulated a wide bandwidth of benchmarks. In other
words, the CDA is increasingly being adopted as an opportunity to advance
rights-based development with divergent standards and in the absence of clear
exit strategies. But though rights-based action is a new orthodoxy in humanit-
arian and development action, confusion remains when it comes to translating it
into practice. As Harris-Curtis notes, ‘NGOs are in the process of adopting the
[rights-based] approach wholesale in all aspects of their work, without knowing
what the consequences will be’ (2002: 2). More worryingly, the uncritical
application of the CDA can potentially threaten the durable solutions to
which refugees are also entitled. Any application of community development
ultimately requires uncomfortable choices.
Background on Bhutanese Refugees
The seven Bhutanese refugee camps, located within an hour’s drive of each other,
have an official population of 101,300 and have existed in the area for eleven
years. The first refugees arrived in Nepal in 1991, with a further influx in 1992 and
a small trickle in the months and years since. The camps are ethnically homo-
geneous, and are made up of Bhutanese of Nepali origin, or Lhotsampas. Though
census data in Bhutan is generally untrustworthy, it is estimated that Bhutanese-
Nepalese make up 40–50 per cent of the population of Bhutan, most having
settled there in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century on subsistence
farms or producing cash crops such as oranges and cardamom. As most of the
rest of the country is mountainous, they were the main agriculturists in Bhutan
and contributed a significant proportion of the gross domestic product.
Lhotsampas were granted citizenship in 1958, as well as rights to participate
in the armed forces, civil service and National Assembly.
In 1985, following growing wariness of their political and economic influence
in the country, the Bhutanese government passed a new citizenship act that
required all Lhotsampas to produce documentary evidence of their qualification
for citizenship. The government similarly nullified earlier legislative acts that
granted citizenship to non-Bhutanese spouses and their children. Almost over-
night, the government enacted the ‘Bhutanese Programme’, an initiative that
enforced on the minority Lhotsampas (who are primarily Hindu), the dress code,
language and social etiquette of the majority Drukpa Buddhists. These measures
sparked protests that led to arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, torture, and
other measures manifestly enacted to frighten the Lhotsampas into leaving. Some
local officials organized evictions and land confiscation, under the pretext of
voluntary migration. In some cases whole villages were evicted or evacuated
en masse.
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By 1991, some 90,000 Bhutanese had arrived in Nepal on the flatbeds of
Indian-owned trucks, crossing India to seek asylum in Nepal. International
attention was muted because of the first US–Iraq Gulf war. Regional sympathy
was similarly limited, as neither Bhutan nor Nepal had signed the 1951 Con-
vention. Despite the many violations of international law that accompanied the
entire process, the forced expulsion went largely unnoticed by the international
community. For one, India abrogated its obligations under the 1951 Convention
by not providing the Lhotsampas with protection and assistance or the option for
resettlement. Today, the Bhutanese refugees enjoy the unenviable distinction of
being one of the world’s ‘forgotten’ emergencies.
Though severely criticized by human rights organizations in the 1990s, the
Bhutanese government has remained intransigent. Under pressure from Nepal
and UNHCR, Bhutan agreed in May 1993 that the ‘Royal Government of
Bhutan will accept full responsibility for [any] bona fide Bhutanese national
who has been forcibly evicted from Bhutan’ and to ‘arrive at a mutually accept-
able agreement on each category to provide a basis for the resolution of the
problem’. Bhutan stalled until the end of 2000, and a Joint Verification Com-
mittee (JVC) was subsequently established to identify ‘genuine’ refugees. Nepal
agreed to the Bhutanese proposal and established four categories of refugees:
those forcibly evicted from Bhutan, those who migrated ‘voluntarily’, non-
Bhutanese refugees, and ‘criminals’ who fled Bhutan. Between 1993 and 2003,
the two governments held 14 rounds of meetings.4
In June 2003, the JVC released the results of the verification process in one
of the seven refugee camps. Only 2.5 per cent of those verified were included in
the first category, or otherwise eligible for repatriation to Bhutan. More than
70 per cent were billed as having ‘voluntarily emigrated’ and would therefore
have to reapply for Bhutanese citizenship. The final 27 per cent were either
described as either non-Bhutanese, or ‘criminals’ who would be liable to be
tried in Bhutanese courts. Verification of the remaining 90,000 refugees living in
the other six camps had not been completed or released at the time of this article.
The Bhutanese Refugee Camps
Despite the fact that they have been languishing in Nepal for more than 12 years,
the Bhutanese refugees’ camps have been widely praised as a model of ‘best
practice’ for ‘care and maintenance’. While these camps cannot be directly com-
pared to other protracted refugee situations, there are nevertheless many lessons
that can be learnt from the developmental approach adopted by UNHCR and its
implementing partners.
Since the transition from emergency to care and maintenance in the mid-1990s,
the Bhutanese refugees have exhibited a high degree of self-reliance and parti-
cipation in the delivery of goods and services. The refugee population also
exhibits comparatively high levels of primary, secondary and tertiary education
(75 per cent literacy and almost 100 per cent school enrolment) and low levels of
mortality and morbidity in comparison to the Nepalese population (see Table 1).
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The primary and preventive health programmes introduced by UNHCR are
believed to have contributed to a marked reduction in the birth rate, as well
as under-five mortality and malnutrition rates (UNHCR 2001). Demographic
data on the refugee population—including census, educational, literacy and
public health records—are regularly updated. Nutritional surveys are conducted
on an annual basis by UNHCR and WFP, and data is submitted to the sub office
and maintained in elaborate databases and filing systems.
Though the Lhotsampas have enjoyed the ‘protection’ of the Nepalese gov-
ernment since 1991, as prima facie refugees they are not legally permitted to work,
own land, leave the camps or engage in political activities. Refugees are therefore
confined to camps, even though the municipal government quietly tolerates the
large numbers that regularly leave the camps as informal labourers, teachers and
doctors in neighbouring communities. Though falling ostensibly under the direct
supervision of Nepalese government officials and subject to Nepalese law, refu-
gee conduct and behaviour is regulated in accordance with ‘camp rules’. These
rules were established by the government coordinating body (the Refugee Com-
munity Unit or RCU) in cooperation with UNHCR in 1992, and are designed to
enforce Nepalese law in the camps and regulate issues as varied as the suspension
of rations for missing refugees to family planning.
The supervision of refugees in each camp, regardless of camp size, is performed
by a single government-appointed (and UNHCR-funded) Camp Supervisor and
Deputy Camp Supervisor as well as six unarmed police. The daily administration
of each camp is coordinated by camp management committees (CMC) that
are composed of volunteer refugees. Elections for CMCs have been held in
each camp since 1993 and their chief purpose is to facilitate distribution of relief
assistance and to assist the government coordinating body (the Refugee Com-
munity Unit), UNHCR and its implementing partners, to manage the camp. In
2001, for example, approximately 636 members were elected to CMC positions
from a total pool of 736 candidates. Each CMC is made up of a board with
Table 1
Literacy and Mortality Rates in Comparison
Country/Group Adult Literacy (%) Under-Five Mortality
(per 1,000)
HDI
Ranking1
India 72.6 96 124
Pakistan 57 110 138
Bhutan – 100 140
Nepal 60.5 100 142
Nepal Refugee Camps (1997) 75 39 –
1The Human Development Index (HDI), which ranks countries according to a number of
development indicators, shows Nepal is behind its neighbours.
Source: Muggah (2002: 34).
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subcommittees responsible for social services, project services, health services,
counselling and administration. The distribution of relief assistance (food and
non-food items) and services are administered through sector heads, sub-sector
heads and assistant sub-sector heads of each camp.
It should be noted that the Bhutanese refugees are drawn from a relatively
hierarchical culture with elaborate systems of social organization. The commun-
ity organization of the refugee camps, while nurtured and to some extent
re-engineered by Bhutanese human rights organizations, UNHCR and imple-
menting partners such as the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) in 1991–1992,
mirrors analogous structures of social control and organization. These agencies
capitalized on pre-existing refugee structures during the early period of the
emergency and helped reshape its management to reflect democratic and (gender)
representative norms and liberal standards. For example, CMC guidelines
require that approximately 50 per cent of elected representatives are women.
The management of camps by the refugees is exemplary. The number of
services carried out by refugees has increased steadily since their arrival. The
cleanliness and order of the camps is, according to the relatively broad experience
of this writer, unmatched. Since the mid-1990s, the Refugee Women’s Forum
(RWF) and other Bhutanese refugee groups have developed an increasingly
sophisticated network of activities with the support of UNHCR and its imple-
menting partners. Their efforts have developed to the extent that they have
successfully appropriated donor language and discourse in their proposals for
financial support. Submissions regularly include log-frame analysis, extensive
and thorough discussion of proposed outputs and appropriate donor nomen-
clature.
Since 1992, though not officially involved in bilateral negotiations between
Nepal and Bhutan, UNHCR has been responsible for the co-ordination of all
protection and assistance activities for Bhutanese refugees. It is currently the
primary funding agency for the provision of health care services, education,
water supply and sanitation, shelter and non-food items. Basic food rations
and supplementary food items are provided by WFP. Since the beginning of
2000, four non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also shared respons-
ibility for the activities in the camps: CARITAS-Nepal; Association for Medical
Doctors for Asia (AMDA); Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS) and the Lutheran
World Federation (LWF).
Hard Choices
There are many challenges with advancing the community development
approach advocated by UNHCR-Nepal. For one, there is a tension between
the desired standards for basic services by UNHCR, which is a humanitarian
agency, and those of its implementing partners, who are ostensibly in support of
more progressive development objectives. This is important because UNHCR’s
implementing partners are responsible for providing critical sector-specific func-
tions such as sanitation, food delivery and the provision of health. The NRCS, for
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example, is primarily responsible for procuring kerosene for the refugee popu-
lation, administering home-garden programmes (for nutritional supplement)
and maintaining high standards of sanitation in the camps. The LWF, on the
other hand, manages infrastructure maintenance and water-delivery as well as
support for small-scale tailoring activities (Bhutanese Refugees Aiding the
Victims of Violence, BRAVVE), micro-enterprise development (RWF) and
programmes for children. The educational provider (primary, secondary and
tertiary) is CARITAS and the preventive, primary and curative health provider is
AMDA and its partner, the Bhutanese Health Association (BHA).
It is incumbent on UNHCR to ensure basic standards of refugee well-being as
well as dispensing cost-effective care and maintenance—with the expectation
of ultimately repatriating, resettling or settling refugees. But UNHCR-
Nepal has not actually set desired benchmarks or objectives for its care and
maintenance activities. In the absence of clear standards or objectives, imple-
menting partners have continued to provide development assistance with the
objective of raising indices of well-being to the highest standard. UNHCR-
Nepal’s operation has become, in effect, a development operation without a
mandate for development.
Since the refugee population has been assisted for more than ten years, the
restructuring of UNHCR’s programme has been an on-going process. The refu-
gees have become increasingly involved in the administration of the camps (via
the CMCs) and in the running of basic services—as teachers, health workers and
construction workers. The fact that UNHCR has acted as a development agency
by default is reflected in the gradually declining funding patterns, and the dra-
matic increase in well-being of the Bhutanese refugee population. Because of the
shift from emergency to care and maintenance, UNHCR’s programmes in Nepal
have suffered budget cuts, falling from just over US$5 million in 1993 to a
projected budget of US$2.8 million in 2002. As a result, UNHCR has tried to
scale back its CDA activities, particularly in healthcare. This has been met with
fierce resistance from a comparatively educated and rights-aware population.
Predictably, dissatisfaction with the assistance provided by UNHCR and its
implementing partners is growing. Many leaders of the refugee community,
including university-educated refugees, are leaving the camps.
Haemorrhaging Camps
In spite of apparently high levels of social (health and educational) well-being,
cracks are emerging in UNHCR’s care and maintenance of refugees. Findings
from participatory exercises and key informant interviews with refugees in five of
the seven camps and with implementing partners, revealed a number of disturb-
ing trends. Among the many issues reported were rising addiction to alcohol;
growing incidence of child marriage; increasing levels of polygamy; issues of
prostitution inside and outside of the refugee camps; trafficking of women to
India; disappearance of physically and mentally handicapped children; unusually
high levels of mental illness; the growing incidence of suicide; a rising school
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drop-out rate; a higher than average degree of elopement; and rumours of forced
sterilization by the local authorities.
Each of the issues mentioned above was raised repeatedly by respondents and
implementing partners. Anecdotal, participatory and descriptive epidemiologi-
cal evidence substantiated their claims. Triangulation of the accounts yielded
some authenticity, as UNHCR discovered in November 2002 (see Table 2).5
These concerns should be placed in context, as the provision of basic needs
and general welfare of refugees are high in comparison with other refugee popu-
lations. Moreover, many of the problems emerging in the camps are also present
in the host communities. Nevertheless, their prevalence illustrates a gradual
social deterioration that threatens the collective livelihoods of the Bhutanese
refugee community. The absence of a durable solution coupled with growing
levels of stress, are in large part to blame.
In the absence of a durable solution, the refugees voiced growing levels of
frustration and hopelessness. Their concerns have led to a growth in prostitution,
a spiralling incidence of mental illness and intake of anti-depressants and a
growing vulnerability of unemployed and disgruntled children to forced recruit-
ment. For example, young women are believed to regularly leave the refugee
camps in search of economic opportunities in communities known for their high
levels of prostitution (in border-areas of Nepal and the adjoining Indian states of
West Bengal and Bihar). A number of refugees were also arrested for ‘trafficking
in women’ and were incarcerated in local Nepalese jails.
These perceived injustices are a growing concern. An experienced doctor work-
ing with AMDA, the UNHCR’s primary health-care provider, noted that the
incidence of mental illness was alarmingly high: ‘I worked in Afghanistan for two
years [where psychological trauma was acute] and these levels of mental illness
among the Bhutanese are the highest I have ever seen’. The incidence of stress
and mental illness is equally linked to the issue of education. The director of
the educational provider, CARITAS, also noted the growing frustration
among youth who, in the absence of employment or further educational
Table 2
Warning Signs: Comparing Indicators in the Refugee Camps
Rates (per 100,000) 1999 2000 2001 2002
(predicted)
Actual
(by mid 2002)
Suicide 2 5 11 10 4
Mental illness – 7.8 6.2 2.6 –
Malaria – 3.8 7.0 7.6 3.2
TB – 2.3 5.9 6.2 2.4
STD – – 10.4 7.8 3.3
Source: Muggah (2002: 35).
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possibilities, are becoming increasingly radicalized and susceptible to recruit-
ment by Maoist insurgents.
These problems are not necessarily new but have been allowed to grow more
serious as a result of a lack of holistic awareness on the part of UNHCR and its
implementing partners. The reasons for this are twofold: implementing partners
are not effectively analysing data and the ‘right’ questions are not necessarily
being put forward or followed up. Though baseline data is continuously col-
lected on a wide range of indices of health and social well-being, the extent to
which this data is processed, analysed and understood is in question. Reports are
drawn up and dispatched to headquarters, but it is unclear if the programme is
even capable of understanding the dimensions of social deterioration, much less
responding appropriately to the situation. Part of the problem relates to the fact
that the ‘right’ questions are not being asked by UNHCR and implementing
partner staff. Conventional indicators of suicide, mental illness, prostitution,
child trafficking and the like are simply not registered. Even basic data docu-
menting trends in refugee health were not available prior to 2000.
Setting Unrealistic Objectives?
Whether narrowly or broadly interpreted, the introduction of ‘community
development’ to emergency or care and maintenance operations is accompanied
by a set of values, norms and principles associated with human rights, gender
equality and democratization. According to the CDA, however, community
development is supposed to improve the ‘delivery’ of services rather than
serve as an end or ‘good’ in and of itself. It is vital that UNHCR recognizes
that this is the case. This is because straightforward decisions taken by pro-
gramme staff, ranging from the promotion of democratization in decision-
making to the promotion of women’s issues through sensitization campaigns,
can have practical implications for both the appropriate staffing of UNHCR and
long-term or durable solutions for refugees.
In theory, UNHCR endorses a liberal framework for the promotion and
expression of political rights that includes the participation of women and vul-
nerable groups in decision-making and the promotion of self-reliance through
democratic decision-making structures. At the most practical level, there is some
awareness among UNHCR staff and implementing partners that customary and
local norms can influence the ‘effectiveness’ or ‘desired aims’ of UNHCR’s
activities, including the short-term strategy of self-reliance and empowerment.
But it must also be recalled that local UNHCR staff who have not been trained in,
or share, notions of progressive liberal rights may be unfamiliar with—and even
latently opposed to—the imposition of a liberal approach espoused by UNHCR.
In the case of Nepal, customary norms might include caste systems, local
‘acceptance’ of forced sterilization, acceptance of patriarchal decision-making
and non-participatory decision-making. A number of local staff may not
be adequately equipped with the liberal sensibilities to register, measure and
UNHCR’s Community Development Approach in Nepal 161
respond to stated community service priorities. As a result, guidelines and train-
ing courses organized in Geneva may not sufficiently inculcate these principles
in local staff.
A more fundamental concern relates to the promulgation of liberal and pro-
gressive rights by UNHCR and its implementing partners as ‘goods’ or ‘ends’ in
and of themselves. While it is impossible for UNHCR to refute the desirability of
secondary and tertiary education, access to all facets of curative care, the empow-
erment and progress of women and the development of democratic decision-
making, these ‘ends’ have long-term implications for the repatriation of refugees
to their country of origin. In the case of Bhutanese refugees, the more demo-
cratically inclined, the less likely the Bhutanese government will allow them a safe
and voluntary repatriation. The JVC, established in 2001 by the governments of
Nepal and Bhutan, has demonstrated little progress toward the elaboration of
a durable solution.
Even if repatriation was a possibility, refugees with a strong desire to promote
gender equality would find integration into Bhutan’s traditionally patriarchal
society difficult. The wider Bhutanese population, let alone its government,
shares few common values in this regard. The Nepalese government is also
wary of settling refugees locally, given that they represent a relatively competitive
(and comparatively cheap) labour pool. Moreover, they are understandably
concerned with the precedent such an action might create.
Conclusion
UNHCR has a mandate to protect refugees and ensure a durable solution to their
plight. In the absence of clear durable resolutions following a refugee emergency,
the agency is committed to providing ‘care and maintenance’ in camps or urban
contexts. These obligations place considerable strain on the organization’s
resources at a time when demands for their services are growing. In response,
the agency has initiated a CDA, a set of progressive approaches to care and
maintenance operations that are designed to encourage ownership, promote
self-reliance and reduce the costs of services. However, the objectives have
not been limited to these realizable ends but have rather been left ambiguous
and ambitious.
The approaches endorsed by the CDA are often interpreted as ends rather
than means. The CDA is perceived by some within UNHCR, and among
implementing partners, as a set of fundamental rights. Even if the pursuit
of these intermediate ends may be intuitively desirable, their uncritical
application can have implications for the ‘successful’ achievement of durable
solutions. The case of Bhutanese camps in Nepal, viewed by the former High
Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, as the most successful refugee
settlements in the world, highlights the tensions underlying the application
of community development without clear benchmarks and standards.
UNHCR must begin thinking creatively about how it can move beyond emer-
gency standards in protracted refugee situations to measures that strengthen
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self-reliance and empower refugees but do not simultaneously undermine the
prospects for achieving a durable solution.
1. This article was written in parallel with an independent evaluation of UNHCR’s
community services function. The findings of the evaluation are on-line at
www.unhcr.ch. The author visited the Nepal refugee camps in 2002 as part of the
team commissioned to undertake the community services evaluation. This article
represents his own views, and not those of UNHCR or NGOs working in Jhapa, Nepal.
2. A working group on services and community development was set up in the early
1990s in order to review how UNHCR programmes might benefit from a community
approach in care and maintenance activities. It noted that limitations in the
conventional approach ‘could be overcome by empowering refugees, treating them as
resourceful and active partners in all assistance and protection activities’ (UNHCR
2001: 4). The Group included NGOs such as the Dutch Relief and Rehabilitation
Agency, Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, Save the Children
Norway/Sweden, International Catholic Migration Committee and the Norwegian
Refugee Council. See also UNHCR (1996, 1992).
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cies. See also Harris-Curtis (2002) and Sen (1999).
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India—as Bhutan’s foreign policy is officially guided by India under a treaty signed
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problem is a bilateral issue between Bhutan and Nepal and, therefore, declined to
participate in the process.
5. UNHCR sent an investigation team in November 2002 to assess the situation. It found
18 cases of sexual abuse and exploitation. This was subsequently reported by Amnesty
International in the same month. The findings of the investigation ultimately revealed
that ‘there had been no wrongdoing on the part of the staff members, that no instruc-
tions had been willfully disregarded, and that therefore the conduct of the staff
members did not justify disciplinary action’ (UNHCR 2004).
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